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Abstract
Metadata produced by members of a diverse community of peers tend to contain low-quality or
even mutually inconsistent assertions. Trust values computed on the basis of users’ feedback can
improve metadata quality and reduce inconsistency, eliminating untrustworthy assertions.
In this paper, we describe an approach to metadata creation and improvement, where community
members express their opinions on the trustworthiness of each assertion. Our technique aggregates
individual trustworthiness values to obtain a community-wide assessment of each assertion. We then
apply a global trustworthiness threshold to eliminate some assertions to reduce the metadatabase’s
overall inconsistency.
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1 Introduction
The growing need of share and manage knowledge about data is strictly con-
nected to the interest in studying and developing systems for generating and
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managing metadata. Typically, metadata provide annotations specifying con-
tent, quality, type, creation, and spatial information of a data item. Though
a number of specialized formats based on Resource Description Framework
(RDF) are available, metadata can be stored in any format such as a text
ﬁle, eXtensible Markup Language (XML), or database record. There are a
number of advantages in using information extracted from data instead of
data themselves. First of all, because of their small size compared to the
data they describe, metadata are more easily shareable than data. Thanks
to metadata shareability, information about data becomes readily available to
anyone seeking it. Thus, metadata make data discovery easier and reduces
data duplication.
On the other hand, metadata can be generated by a number of sources (the
data owner, other users, automatic tools) and may or may not be digitally
signed by their author. Therefore, metadata have non-uniform trustworthi-
ness. To take full advantage of metadata, it is fundamental that (i) users are
aware of each metadata level of trustworthiness, (ii) metadata trustworthiness
is continuously updated, for example, based on the view of the user commu-
nity. This is even more important when the original sources of metadata are
automatic metadata generators whose error rates are not negligible, or when
metadata are created via peer certiﬁcations, that is, via assertions by users
that other users belong to a category or have a given property. In some systems
(e.g., Advogato [12]), peer certiﬁcations are input to a trust metric, whose out-
put is a simple Boolean value for each user. Here, we are interested in a more
general case, when metadata consists of generic assertions that may or may
not be peer certiﬁcations. Also, in this paper we do not impose any constraint
on the schema for these assertions. Rather, we plan to use a fuzzy metric of
trustworthiness to improve the overall quality of a metadata base composed
of independently generated assertions. Metadata produced by members of a
diverse community of peers tend to contain sets of mutually inconsistent as-
sertions. A simple example is the triple “X belongs to class A”, “X belongs
to class B” and “class A is the complement of class B”. In our approach,
inconsistency is not detected or corrected via reasoning. 6 Rather, we leave it
to community members to express their views on the trustworthiness of each
assertion in the metadata base. Then, we aggregate individual trustworthi-
ness values to obtain a community-wide assessment of each assertion. Finally,
we apply a trustworthiness threshold to eliminate some assertions, hopefully
reducing the overall inconsistency of the metadatabase. In this paper, our
6 Detecting inconsistencies by comparing assertions poses several practical problems due
to diﬀerent ways of expressing the same assertion. For instance, should “X ” be an ASCII
string, containing the name of the resource, a cryptographic hash of the resource itself or
the URL where the resource can be downloaded?
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aim is to describe an aggregation function to compute community-wide trust
values on metadata. Our aggregator is able to take into consideration various
aspects connected to human behavior when accessing metadata.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses how
diﬀerent trust values can be aggregated. Section 3 presents the architecture
of our proof-of-concept prototype together with the aggregation technique.
Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper.
2 A fuzzy-based approach for trust aggregation
There are two main problems in managing trustworthiness values about meta-
data assertions: how to collect them and how to aggregate them. Several dif-
ferent approaches to collecting ratings have been proposed, based on implicit
and/or explicit behavior of users. Traditionally, research approaches [4,9] dis-
tinguish between two main types of trust management systems, namely Cen-
tralized Reputation Systems and Distributed Reputation Systems. 7
In centralized reputation systems, trust information is collected from mem-
bers in the community in the form of ratings on resources. The central au-
thority collects all the ratings and derives a score for each resource.
In a distributed reputation system there is no a central location for sub-
mitting ratings and obtaining resources’ reputation scores; instead, there are
distributed stores where ratings can be submitted. In a “pure” P2P setting,
each peer has its own repository of trust values. In both cases, initial metadata
trust values (often produced through a non completely trusted production pro-
cess) can be modiﬁed based on users’ navigation activity. Information on user
behavior can be captured and transformed in a metadata layer expressing the
trust degree related to the single assertion. 8
Ratings based on implicit user behavior can take into account the time
spent by each user working on the resource. On the other hand, users can
express their views on metadata describing a resource by casting a vote on
each assertion’s trustworthiness. These explicit votes are usually cast by a
small subset of the users, depending on their role or their expertise.
The main problem to solve, once trust values have been collected, is their
aggregation. First of all, it is necessary to take into account the level of
anonymity provided by the system. If all users are anonymous, all votes con-
7 There is a clear distinction between trust and reputation. In general, a trust value T can
be computed based on its reputation R, that is, T = φ(R, t), where t is the time elapsed
since when the reputation was last modiﬁed [3].
8 While we shall not deal with metadata signing in this paper, it is important to remember
that assertions can be digitally signed.
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tribute in the same way to the overall trust value on metadata assertions
about a resource. When users have an identity, ratings have to be aggregated
initially at user level, and then at global level. Several techniques for comput-
ing reputation and trust measures in non-anonymous environments have been
proposed [10] that can be brieﬂy summarized as follows.
• Summation or Average of ratings. This technique computes the sum of posi-
tive and negative ratings separately, obtaining the total score by subtracting
the negative votes from the positive ones.
• Bayesian Systems. This kind of systems take binary ratings as input and
compute reputation scores by statistically updating beta probability density
functions (PDF). They are particularly used in recommender systems [2].
• Discrete Trust Models. These models rely on human verbal statements to
rate assertions (e.g., Very Trustworthy, Trustworthy, Untrustworthy, Very
Untrustworthy).
• Belief Models. Belief theory is a framework related to probability theory,
but where the sum of beliefs over all possible outcomes does not necessarily
add up to 1. The missing part is interpreted as uncertainty.
• Fuzzy Models. Linguistic variables can be used to represent trust; in this
case, membership functions describe to what degree an assertion can be
described as trustworthy or not trustworthy.
• Flow Models. They compute trust by transitive iteration through looped or
arbitrarily long chains.
Our approach computes the level of trust of an assertion as the aggregation
of multiple fuzzy values representing trust resulting from human interactions
with metadata assertions. In principle, this method could be used to assign a
trust value to any kind of data [6], but in this case data semantics may not be
clear enough to support automatic choice of the correct aggregation operator
to be used. Knowledge about the context connected to data is fundamental
so the choice of the correct operator is strongly context-dependent.
Dealing with metadata, the choice of the aggregation operator for trust
values remains crucial, but metadata richer semantics makes this work easier.
A simple arithmetic average would perform a rough compensation between
high and low values; for this reason we turned to the Weighted Mean [1]
and the Ordered Weighted Averaging operator [14], whose behavior has been
analyzed in [7,8]. The diﬀerence between these two functions is in the meaning
they assign to weights that have to be combined with input values. Weighted
means aggregate trust values from diﬀerent sources, taking into account the
reliability of each source. On the other hand, the OWA operator weights trust
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Fig. 1. The architecture of our prototype
values in relation to their size, without taking into account which sources have
expressed them.
Our solution represents an alternative to statistical or probabilistic ap-
proaches (e.g., Bayesian Systems or Belief Methods). In [3] an OWA-based
solution is compared with a probabilistic approach, called EigenTrust [11],
where a reputation is deﬁned as a probability and can be computed by an
event-driven method using a Bayesian interpretation. From this comparison
results that a major advantage of fuzzy aggregation techniques is their speed.
In [3] we showed that, even if the fuzzy solution has a slower start-up, the
global convergence speed is faster than the EigenTrust algorithm.
In non-anonymous scenarios, diﬀerent users or roles express votes on an
assertion. Therefore, it is important to weight each vote according to the
reliability of the user who casts it (e.g., based on her proﬁle). Furthermore,
votes can be aggregated depending on a number of other criteria (e.g., user
location, connection medium, and so on).
In the following Section, we brieﬂy describe the architecture of our proof-
of-concept prototype and present the aggregation function that takes into
consideration the above-mentioned aspects.
3 Architecture and aggregation function
A proof-of-concept prototype has been designed and implemented to vali-
date the proposed method. Figure 1 illustrates the architecture of our proto-
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type. A centralized Metadata Publication Center (MPC) collects and displays
metadata assertions, possibly in diﬀerent formats and coming from diﬀerent
sources. The MPC can be regarded as a semantic search engine, contain-
ing metadata provided by automatic generators crawling the web or by other
interested parties. The MPC will assign diﬀerent trust values to assertions
depending on their origin: assertions manually provided by a domain expert
are much more reliable than assertions automatically generated and submitted
by a crawler.
The metadata in the MPC are indexed and a group of Clients interacts
with the metadata by navigating them and providing implicitly (with their
behavior) or explicitly (by means of an explicit vote) an evaluation about
metadata trustworthiness. This trust-related information is passed by the
MPC to the Trust Manager . The TM is composed of two modules:
• the Trust Evaluator examines metadata and evaluates their reliability;
• the Trust Aggregator aggregates all inputs coming from the Trust Evaluator
clients according to a suitable aggregation function (in our prototype, the
WOWA operator, as discussed in the next subsection).
The Trust Manager is the computing engine behind the MPC module that
provides interested parties with a visual overview on the metadata reliability
distribution.
We are now ready to present the function used for aggregating trust values.
3.1 The WOWA operator
The Weighted OWA operator (WOWA) [13] is a promising approach, because
it combines the advantages of both the OWA operator and the weighted mean.
WOWA uses two sets of weights: p corresponds to the relevance of the sources,
and w corresponds to the relevance of the values.
Deﬁnition 3.1 Let p and w be two weight vectors of dimension n (p =
[p1 p2 ... pn], w = [w1 w2 ... wn]) such that: i) pi ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
i pi = 1; ii)
wi ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
i wi = 1. A mapping fWOWA : R
n → R is a Weighted Ordered
Weighted Averaging (WOWA) operator of dimension n if
fWOWA(a1, a2, ..., an) =
∑
i
ωiaσ(i)(1)
where {σ(1), σ(2), ..., σ(n)} is a permutation of {1, 2, ..., n} such that
aσ(i−1) ≥ aσ(i), i = 2, ..., n, weight ωi is deﬁned as
ωi = w
∗
(∑
j≤i
pσ(j)
)
− w∗
(∑
j<i
pσ(j)
)
(2)
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(a) (b)
Fig. 2. The interpolation functions w′∗ (a) and w′′∗ (b)
with w∗ a monotonic function (e.g., a polynomial) that interpolates the
points (i/n,
∑
j≤i wj) together with the point (0, 0). Term ω denotes the set
of weights {ωi}, that is, ω = {ω1, ω2, ..., ωn}.
Compared with plain OWA, the WOWA operator allows to model more
complex situations, for example, a scenario in which not all voters are equal,
regardless of the vote they express.
Selecting the WOWA operator
Given two weight vectors p and w and a data vector a, let S =
{(i/n,
∑
j≤i wj) | i = 1, ..., n} ∪ {0, 0}. According to Deﬁnition 3.1, we need
to deﬁne the function w∗ interpolating S. To this purpose, two possible ap-
proached can be applied:
• we ﬁrst deﬁne vector w and then function w∗ is established;
• we ﬁrst deﬁne function w∗.
In the ﬁrst approach, the monotonic function w∗ can be obtained by ap-
plying any method that, starting from the monotonic data points in the unit
interval, deﬁnes a monotonic, bounded function.
In the second approach, the set of weights ω is derived from w∗, where w∗ is
any monotonically increasing function within the [0, 1] interval with w∗(0) = 0
and w∗(1) = 1.
Referring to the ﬁrst method, suppose that we have a set of input values
a = [a1 a2 a3 a4] already listed in a decreasing order. The weighting vector w
is determined according to the importance that we assign to the data values.
For instance, vector w′ = [.1 .4 .4 .1] indicates that central values are more im-
portant than extreme ones; by contrast, vector w′′ = [.4 .1 .1 .4] indicates that
extreme values are the most important. Figure 2(a) and Figure 2(b) illustrates
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(a) (b)
Fig. 3. Weights wi in the diﬃdent approach (a) and in the conﬁdent approach (b)
the corresponding interpolation functions w′∗ and w′′∗, respectively 9 .
A correct deﬁnition of the vector p allows us to take into consideration
trust values reliability depending on their information source. For instance,
by taking vector w′ = [.1 .4 .4 .1] (or function w′∗) and p′ = [.15 .35 .35 .15]
(where central values are considered to be more reliable), it is easy to see that
the weights ω1 and ω2 (Equation 2) grow with wi, because the weighting vector
w enhances central values. As another example, vector p′′ = [.35 .15 .15 .35]
leads to decreasing central ωi because central values are considered less reliable
then extreme ones.
3.2 An Example
We now give a worked-out example illustrating two diﬀerent approaches in
assigning relevance to the data values. For the sake of simplicity, we assume
that array w is composed of values of the form wi =
k
n
. The following two
cases are then considered:
Diﬃdent. Variable k ranges from 1 to n (Figure 3(a)).
Conﬁdent. Variable k ranges from n to 1 (Figure 3(b)).
The diﬃdent approach.
Looking at Figure 3(a) and considering the fact that the
WOWA operator is applied to a permutation of data values ai(
where aσ(i−1) ≥ aσ(i), ∀i = 2, ..., n
)
it is easy to understand why the
ﬁrst approach is called “diﬃdent”: it reduces the impact of high trust values.
9 Note that, following the second approach, it is possible to ﬁrst deﬁne the interpolation
function and then to extract the weighting vector.
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Fig. 4. The interpolation function w∗ in the diﬃdent approach
The weights wi = k/n, k = 1, . . . , n, have to be normalized by dividing them
by their sum:
wi =
k/n∑n
k=1 k/n
.
Suppose now that a = [.9 .7 .5 .3 .1] (the values are already ordered),
p = [ 1
15
4
15
2
15
5
15
3
15
], and w = [1
5
2
5
3
5
4
5
1]. We obtain the normalized vector
w
n
= [1
5
2
5
3
5
4
5
1]/15
5
= [ 1
15
2
15
3
15
4
15
5
15
]. The next step consists in ﬁnding a
function w∗ interpolating the points (i/n,
∑
j≤i wj):
i = 1
(
1
5
, w1
)
=
(
1
5
, 1
15
)
i = 2
(
2
5
, w1 + w2
)
=
(
2
5
, 3
15
)
=
(
2
5
, 1
5
)
i = 3
(
3
5
, w1 + w2 + w3
)
=
(
3
5
, 6
15
)
=
(
3
5
, 2
5
)
i = 4
(
4
5
, w1 + w2 + w3 + w4
)
=
(
4
5
, 10
15
)
=
(
4
5
, 2
3
)
i = 5 (1, w1 + w2 + w3 + w4 + w5) = (1, 1)
The equation of the interpolation function (Figure 4) is:
w∗(x) =
5
6
x2 +
1
6
x .
We use w∗(x) to compute the ﬁnal weights ωi:
i = 1 ω1 = w
∗(p1) = w
∗
(
1
15
)
= 2
135
i = 2 ω2 = w
∗
(∑2
i=1 pi
)
− w∗(p1) = w
∗
(
1
3
)
− w∗
(
1
15
)
= 2
15
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i = 3 ω3 = w
∗
(∑3
i=1 pi
)
− w∗
(∑2
i=1 pi
)
= w∗
(
7
15
)
− w∗
(
1
3
)
= 1
9
i = 4 ω4 = w
∗
(∑4
i=1 pi
)
− w∗
(∑3
i=1 pi
)
= w∗
(
4
5
)
− w∗
(
7
15
)
= 11
27
i = 5 ω5 = w
∗
(∑5
i=1 pi
)
− w∗
(∑4
i=1 pi
)
= w∗ (1)− w∗
(
4
5
)
= 1
3
We are now ready to compute the ﬁnal value of fWOWA (σ is the iden-
tical permutation):
fWOWA(.9, .7, .5, .3, .1) =
5∑
i=1
ωiai = .317 .
Note that, in this example, the simple OWA method introduced in [3] cor-
responds to equation
∑5
i=1 wiai. It is immediate to see that the result is
only inﬂuenced by the ordering of the vector a and by the relevance values
of the weighting vector w and that the relevance of the sources providing the
trust values is not considered at all. In this case, the ﬁnal result would be
fOWA(.9, .7, .5, .3, .1) =
∑5
i=1 wiai = .36.
The conﬁdent approach.
We enhance the impact of high trust values in array a by choosing a func-
tion interpolating the points (i/n,
∑
j≤i wj), where wi =
k
n
, k = n, n−1, . . . , 1.
Operating in the same way as before on the weighted normalized vector
w
n
= [ 5
15
4
15
3
15
2
15
1
15
], we obtain the w∗ interpolating function:
i = 1
(
1
5
, w1
)
=
(
1
5
, 5
15
)
=
(
1
5
, 1
3
)
i = 2
(
2
5
, w1 + w2
)
=
(
2
5
, 9
15
)
=
(
2
5
, 3
5
)
i = 3
(
3
5
, w1 + w2 + w3
)
=
(
3
5
, 12
15
)
=
(
3
5
, 4
5
)
i = 4
(
4
5
, w1 + w2 + w3 + w4
)
=
(
4
5
, 14
15
)
i = 5 (1, w1 + w2 + w3 + w4 + w5) = (1, 1)
The w∗ interpolating function is expressed by the following equation
(Figure 5):
w∗(x) = −
5
6
x2 +
11
6
x .
The ﬁnal weights ωi are calculated as follows (p is the same vector used
in the previous example):
i = 1 ω1 = w
∗(p1) = w
∗
(
1
15
)
= 16
135
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Fig. 5. The interpolation function w∗ in the conﬁdent approach
i = 2 ω2 = w
∗
(∑2
i=1 pi
)
− w∗(p1) = w
∗
(
1
3
)
− w∗
(
1
15
)
= 2
5
i = 3 ω3 = w
∗
(∑3
i=1 pi
)
− w∗
(∑2
i=1 pi
)
= w∗
(
7
15
)
− w∗
(
1
3
)
= 7
45
i = 4 ω4 = w
∗
(∑4
i=1 pi
)
− w∗
(∑3
i=1 pi
)
= w∗
(
4
5
)
− w∗
(
7
15
)
= 7
27
i = 5 ω5 = w
∗
(∑5
i=1 pi
)
− w∗
(∑4
i=1 pi
)
= w∗ (1)− w∗
(
4
5
)
= 1
15
As expected, the ﬁnal trust value given by the computation of the
function fWOWA
10 is higher respect to the “diﬃdent” approach:
fWOWA(.9, .7, .5, .3, .1) =
5∑
i=1
ωiai = .548 .
4 Conclusions
We have presented a WOWA-based aggregation technique on individual trust
values on metadata assertions. These assertions can be automatically gener-
ated by collecting user feedback in a non-intrusive way. Our technique allows
to take several eﬀects into account, including users’ attitude and sources re-
liability. When assertions are associated with identities of annotators, our
schema can readily be extended to deal with trust on annotators as well
10 As illustrated for the previous approach, the fOWA would be fOWA(.9, .7, .5, .3, .1) =∑5
i=1
wiai = .63.
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as on assertions [3]. It is also possible to envision many other usage sce-
narios, such as the one involving non-functional descriptors of web services
published by service providers in a service-oriented software architecture. In
this case, our approach could deal with the non-uniform reliability of service
self-descriptions, which is liable to imprecision and may lead to unexpected
results [5].
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